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There is a widespread perception that taxing in sub-Saharan Africa has been and 
remains fraught with problems or government failure. This is not generally true. For 
more than a century, colonial administrations and independent states have steadily 
developed the capacity to routinely collect more substantial revenues than one might 
expect in a low-income region. The two main historical dimensions of this collection 
capacity were (a) powerful, centralized bureaucracies focused on achieving revenue 
collection targets and (b) large, taxable international trade sectors. In recent 
decades, those centralized bureaucracies have to some extent been reformed such 
that in structure and procedure they resemble more closely tax administrations in 
OECD countries. More strikingly, nearly all states have adopted VAT and found it to 
be a very powerful revenue collection instrument. However, the tax share of GDP 
has been broadly constant for several decades, and it will be hard to increase it. It is 
difficult for African governments to effectively tax transnational corporations, 
especially in the mining and energy sectors, which are of growing importance. Tax 
administrations continue to approach richer Africans with a light touch, and to 
exaggerate the potential for taxing small-scale (‘informal’) enterprises. The revenue 
operations of sub-national governments are often opaque. Ordinary people often pay 
large sums in ‘informal taxes’ that are generally regressive in impact. And the 
standard direction of travel in the reform of tax policy and administration is not 
appropriate to those large areas, especially in the Sahel, that are afflicted by internal 
and cross-border armed conflicts. 
Keywords: tax, revenue, sub-Saharan Africa, history, tax reform, tax administration, 
customs. 
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If you play the word association game with tax and African states, what other words come to 
mind? For many people interested in development policy or Africa, the answer will likely 
include: difficult, challenging, inefficient, and inexperienced. There is a widespread 
perception that in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) taxing is a new enterprise and/or has been and 
remains fraught with problems or government failure. Those perceptions are bolstered by a 
range of more specific narratives: that African governments cannot raise enough tax revenue 
to finance essential functions, and continue to depend heavily on foreign aid; that the 
coercive nature of direct colonial taxation made it very difficult for later governments to 
collect taxes; that Africans today are sceptical and hostile towards official tax collectors, and 
widely view them as corrupt; and that many Africans identify so strongly with particular 
ethnic, religious, or regional groups that they feel no obligation to pay taxes to central 
government.  
There is some truth in all these narratives. But the overall implication is wrong. Taxing is not 
an unfamiliar enterprise. Sub-Saharan African states do not on average tax particularly 
poorly. In fact, today they are quite proficient tax collectors. At least until the Covid pandemic 
pushed them deep into debt, a growing number of them were becoming fiscal states, i.e. 
they possessed sufficiently reliable tax bases—and thus debt repayment capacity—to 
borrow, at commercial rates, on international financial markets (African Development Bank 
2021: 49–50). After a couple of decades of economic stagnation or decline in the 1970s to 
1990s, some African economies began to grow relatively fast. Government revenue 
collections increased accordingly. They began to exceed aid inflows around 1995, and today 
are the dominant source of government income. While aid remains significant, aid 
dependence is now confined to a small number of especially troubled states (Moore et al. 
2018: 29–30). 
The aid dependence that many people associate with SSA had neither a long nor a deep 
history. The average government in the region received more money from aid donors than it 
raised in taxes only for about a decade, from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s (Moore et al. 
2018: 29–30). Long before that, colonial and independent governments funded themselves 
almost entirely from internal revenue sources. With significant wobbles only between the 
mid-1970s and the mid-1990s, governments in SSA otherwise steadily increased the 
proportion of GDP that they captured as revenue from 1900 almost until today.1 Although 
they rarely attained the status of fiscal states, in that they generally could not borrow long 
term at commercial rates of interest in international financial markets, they were tax states 
according to Schumpeter’s definition (Schumpeter 1918/1991): they financed themselves 
mainly from broad general taxation, and not principally from the earnings of state-owned 
assets like land, industry, mines, post offices, and railways, or from state trading monopolies 
in products like salt or alcohol. 
Contemporary sub-Saharan African governments on average score better than their 
counterparts in South Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean in quantitative performance 
measures relating to (a) the amount of revenue raised (relative to potential revenue) and (b) 
 
1  I note in passing the irony that, while there is a large academic literature analysing the recurrent failures of many African 
states to perform the basic governance task of effectively controlling territory, populations, and borders (e.g. Bayart 1993; 
Bayart et al. 1999; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Englebert 2000), their relative success in the equally basic function of raising 
revenue has gone largely unnoticed by Africanist scholars. Similarly, in the literature and debates about government 
revenue in contemporary SSA, there is near silence on an issue that features regularly in the standard histories of fiscal 
states: the extent to which revenue-collecting activities are unified and coherent, or dispersed and competitive (Yun 




the effectiveness of national tax administrations (Section 1). However, if we examine the 
functioning of African revenue systems from the perspectives of taxpayers or tax 
administration specialists, it seems less impressive. Revenue burdens are often distributed 
very unfairly; extortion and corruption in assessment and collection are not rare; there is little 
transparency; and procedures for registration, assessment, and collection are often 
unnecessarily inconvenient for taxpayers (Section 5).  
The first purpose of this paper is to explain the tension between these two somewhat 
contradictory sets of observations: modest success when judged in terms of aggregate 
comparative performance measures, but very visible, concrete problems in organizational 
processes, including in interactions with taxpayers. There are two main steps in the 
explanation. 
First, African national tax administrations have been able, over long periods of time, to raise 
significant revenues from what are, from an organizational and political perspective, two 
distinctly different types of revenue:  
(a) The first is easy taxes.2 This is revenue from sources that can be identified relatively 
simply and accurately by tax administrations, and thus costs little to collect and does 
not provoke strong taxpayer resistance at the points of assessment or collection. In 
varying ways over the period of 120 years for which we have data, international trade 
has been the major source of easy taxes in SSA.  
(b) The second is challenging-but-enforceable taxes. These have three characteristics: 
taxpayer identification and revenue collection require considerable organizational 
effort on the part of tax administrations; they are intrinsically likely to generate high 
levels of taxpayer resentment and resistance; but they nevertheless can be collected 
because taxpayers are most of the time politically too weak to resist a determined 
organizational effort. The classic examples are colonial-era ‘head and hut’ taxes 
(Section 3). There are, however, elements of these challenging-but-enforceable 
taxes in more recent and contemporary African revenue systems (Moore 2020). 
Second, and consequently, revenue systems in SSA have not been significantly shaped by 
extended, robust confrontation and political negotiation between governments and tax 
administrations on the one side and, on the other, organizations representing the collective 
interests of major taxpayer groups.3 Governments have been able to raise significant 
revenues without taking the political risk of challenging powerful taxpayer interest groups. 
Large taxpayers typically engage with government over tax issues on an individual rather 
than a collective basis.  
The second purpose of the paper is to use these insights into the history of taxation in SSA 
to make a judgement about the scope for contemporary governments to increase 
revenues—and especially to increase the proportion of GDP taken in taxes—to enable them, 
for example, to better deal with the consequences of the Covid pandemic, or otherwise 
promote more equitable human development. The judgement is presented in more detail in 
Section 7. The main conclusion is that, although sub-Saharan African states have long been 
better revenue collectors than they are often given credit for, they seem currently to have 
reached a performance plateau. Despite many positive signs, the ratio of tax to GDP seems 
 
2  ‘Easy’ and ‘challenging-but-enforceable’ taxes are my terms. The current conventional distinction between direct and 
indirect taxes has its origins in abstract economic thinking. It does not coherently capture important differences in the 
political and organizational context in which taxes are collected. The meaning has also changed over time (Keen and 
Slemrod 2021: 117). 





not to have been increasing in recent decades. There is no obvious reason to expect that to 
change. Meanwhile, changes in economic structures are not making revenue collection 
consistently easier.  
 
 
1  Proficient tax collectors  
 
The most basic and common measure of national revenue collection performance—the ‘tax 
take’—is revenue collected annually as a proportion of GDP.4 According to this measure, 
SSA performs well compared with the two other relatively homogeneous and lower-income 
world regions: South Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean.5 All three regions are poor, 
but not equally so. SSA is classified by the World Bank as a Low-Income region, South Asia 
as Lower Middle-Income, and Latin America and the Caribbean as Upper Middle-Income. 
For the period 2011–15, the regional average figures for tax collection as a proportion of 
GDP are 21 per cent for SSA, 16 per cent for South Asia, and 22 per cent Latin America and 
the Caribbean (Moore et al. 2018: 32). The normal expectation is that the ratio of revenue 
collection to GDP will be higher in richer countries. Yet the collection figure for SSA is higher 
than for richer South Asia, and only slightly less than much-richer Latin America and the 
Caribbean. On this basic measure of quantitative collection performance, SSA seems to 
perform well. 
 
We can strengthen that finding using a more refined analytic technique. It is not only income 
per head that is in a statistical sense correlated with the size of the national tax take. 
Repeated econometric analysis using cross-section and time series data relating to large 
samples of countries tells us that there are other characteristics of national economies that 
are consistently associated with the size of the tax take. For reasons that are not hard to 
understand, countries that have high ratios of international trade (imports and exports) to 
GDP and larger non-agricultural or urban sectors also score higher in terms of tax collection 
(Chang et al. 2020: 7). On the basis of these consistent patterns, statisticians are able to 
calculate the tax effort for any country. This is defined as the difference between the amount 
of revenue actually collected and the amount that a country might be predicted to collect in 
the light of its economic structure (income per head, the ratio of international trade to GDP, 
the size of the non-agricultural sector, etc.). In practice, it is difficult to calculate tax effort, 
above all because a great deal of trustworthy data is required. Those reliable estimates that 
we have clearly indicate that tax effort is higher in SSA than in South Asia or Latin America 
and the Caribbean (Moore et al. 2018: 31–32). This confirms that governments in 
contemporary SSA tax more heavily than those in the comparator regions.  
We reach a similar conclusion if we compare the revenue collection performance of 
contemporary sub-Saharan African governments with that of the governments of the now-
rich countries at the point in history when their citizens enjoyed levels of GDP per capita 
similar to those in SSA today. For example, when citizens of Denmark, France, Italy, and 
Japan had an average per capita income of about $1,000 (GK$, 1990 prices), their 
governments on average collected about 8 per cent of GDP in taxes. In those contemporary 
 
4  This is an imperfect measure of the tax take, principally because of the unreliability of many estimates of GDP, especially 
in Africa (Jerven 2013; Prichard 2016). The errors are, however, probably largely random. It is highly unlikely that they 
would affect the intra-regional comparisons presented in the main text. Note also that in formal revenue accounts, total 
government revenue is divided between tax revenue and non-tax revenue. The conceptual distinction is, however, fuzzy, 
and actual accounting practices vary from country to country. Arrangements to collect non-tax revenue are similar to 
those used to collect tax revenue. In referring to tax collection or revenue collection in this paper, I mean total government 
revenue collection unless otherwise specified.    
5  The rest of Asia is very diverse and generally much richer than Africa. In the Middle East and North Africa, oil and gas 




sub-Saharan African countries where average incomes are also around $1,000 (GK$, 1990 
prices), governments collect 12–13 per cent of GDP in revenue.6 
 
 
2  New historical revenue data  
 
When did governments in SSA emerge as relatively successful tax collectors? It is only 
recently, and thanks to the efforts of researchers attached to the African Economic History 
Network based at Lund University, that we have enough information to address this 
question. We now have a dataset on government revenues for SSA for the period since 
1900, i.e. broadly the moment when colonial occupation of most of the region was completed 
(Albers et al. 2020).7 Assembling data on the value of annual revenue collections for each 
government for over a century is laborious, but not conceptually too challenging.8 The more 
testing task is to find a way of representing historical government revenue collections as a 
ratio of some other meaningful measure of national economic activity. The standard 
contemporary measure—revenue as a percentage of GDP—cannot be used, because even 
partly reliable GDP figures for African countries go back at best a few decades (Jerven 
2013). The Lund researchers solved this problem by calculating, for each country and each 
year, the proportion of the total annual number of labour days potentially available from the 
adult population that could be purchased with the revenue collected by government. In other 
words, they tell us how many labour days per year the government could purchase from the 
average adult citizen, paid at the average urban unskilled wage rate, if it were to use all its 
revenue solely for this purpose. This is a real measure of the value of government revenues, 
albeit not the only one that might in principle be used.  
 
The Lund dataset is still a work in progress. But its limitations need not concern us here, 
because we are interested only in broad trajectories. On average, government revenues 
increased relatively steadily throughout the period, such that, in real terms, they are 11 times 
as large today as in 1900 (Albers et al. 2020: 5). In the first decade of the 20th century, the 
average government in SSA raised enough revenue to employ every adult citizen for about 8 
days a year. By 1960, it was about 20 days. In the most recent decade, it has been close to 
100 days. The only significant exception to the overall trend of steadily increasing average 
revenues is that for a period of around two decades, from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, 
average national revenues almost plateaued (Section 4).  
  
 
6  Cathal Long and Mark Miller did the original calculations, showing that the tax-to-GDP ratios of developing countries 
today ‘are not that different from those of today’s higher income countries when they were at a similar stage of 
development’ (Long and Miller 2017: 7 and figure 8). They kindly provided access to their original data, which enabled 
us to demonstrate that, among developing countries, those in SSA are especially likely to collect more revenue today 
than did now-rich countries at similar income levels. 
7  Because the focus of this paper is on macro historical revenue trends, I do not directly cite—and therefore perhaps appear 
to under-appreciate—a great deal of stimulating research on a wide range of issues relating to state revenues in colonial 
Africa, especially much of the work of Ewout Frankema. 




3  The historical trajectory: the colonial era  
 
Three major revenue categories, of approximately equal importance, provided the bulk of 
colonial state incomes in the earlier half of the 20th century: direct9 taxes on African 
individuals and households (‘head and hut taxes’), trade taxes, and non-tax revenues. The 
academic and historical literature on Africa tends, understandably, to focus heavily on the 
first.10 Head and hut taxes were generally regressive in impact and collected oppressively, 
sometimes with the application of considerable force. They were occasionally associated 
with armed resistance to early colonial rule, which included the iconic 1898 Hut Tax War in 
Sierra Leone. It is easier to understand the other components of colonial revenue systems if 
we first appreciate the history of head and hut taxes.11  
 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries—and excepting the brief competitive period labelled 
the ‘scramble for Africa’—European governments had limited enthusiasm either for formally 
extending their African territorial claims or for actually administering the territories formally 
under their control. Proponents and local practitioners of colonial expansion learned that 
they could not expect the administration of newly acquired territories to be subsidized from 
London, Paris, or Lisbon. Neither were there pre-existing large scale revenue systems that 
could be taken over. Early colonial administrations were consequently very revenue-
constrained, thin in terms of staff numbers, and heavily dependent on local intermediaries for 
actual revenue collection—and indeed for the performance of most administrative functions. 
Lacking immediate revenue alternatives, early colonial administrations clamped down on the 
population, house by house and adult male by adult male, extracting forced labour as well as 
cash.12  
This revenue collection activity was meshed in contradictions. Population densities in Africa 
were generally very low. People were mobile and tied more to political networks than to 
specific pieces of land. Much cultivation was impermanent, and for auto-consumption. From 
the European perspective, land rights appeared complex and continuously negotiable. They 
were neither written nor mapped. From the perspective of large-scale bureaucratic political 
systems, it is very hard to tax this type of economy effectively or efficiently. Attempts to track 
and tax scattered, mobile subsistence cultivators almost inevitably result in a high ratio of 
collection costs to collections, especially as the collectors exercise wide discretion in their 
interactions with taxpayers. That in turn implies coercion, corruption, taxpayer resentment 
and the possibility of revolt. No government that had the choice would want to depend 
heavily on this revenue source. But early colonial administrations did not have a great deal 
of choice. At their peak, around 1920, these direct taxes levied on ordinary Africans 
accounted for around 40 per cent of total revenue collected by governments in SSA (Albers 
et al. 2020: 5). This represents only a few percentage points of GDP, but nevertheless is 
 
9  In using the word ‘direct’, I am bypassing a substantial literature on the extent to which the agents who collected these 
taxes should be considered part of the state apparatus or of the machinery of ‘indirect rule’. That question in turn connects 
to a range of other debates among historians: the extent to which the authority of the ‘chiefs’ who were the local agents 
of indirect rule derived purely from their appointment by the colonial state or had a pre-existing local basis; shifts over 
time in the fuzzy boundary between direct and indirect rule; and the stereotype of French colonial preference for direct 
rule over the British predilection for indirect rule. These debates are not directly relevant to this paper. 
10  Contemporary African historiography has focused more on issues of culture and identity than on the material economy 
(Hopkins 2009). Accordingly, taxation has been of interest to Africanist historians and social scientists more from the 
perspective of its impact on ordinary Africans than as a dimension of public finance or national political economy. 
11  See especially Frankema and van Waijenburg (2014); Herbst (2000: chapter 1); and Young (1994: chapter 4). 
12  The routine running costs of colonial administrations were unusually high relative to the incomes of the populations over 
which they ruled. In essence, near-subsistence cultivators were obliged, directly or indirectly, to finance the salaries of 




quite an achievement in purely quantitative terms. The primary collection mechanism was 
force:  
The key to colonial state survival was the transformation of the able-bodied 
African adult male […] into a state revenue flow. Such a transaction required 
large amounts of force. The many brutalities associated with the early 
colonial years, the arsenal of arbitrary legislation with which all colonial 
regimes equipped their field officers […] and the command nature of the 
colonial state all trace their origin to this basic fact (Young 1994: 105). 
This willingness to create the administrative capacity to impose harsh taxation on poor, 
dispersed populations was particularly evident in those parts of Eastern and Southern Africa 
that Thandika Mkandawire (2010) characterized as ‘Africa of the labour reserves’.13 Here, 
white-owned agricultural, plantation, and mining enterprises needed a great deal of African 
labour. Colonial taxation and other policies were designed to encourage or oblige African 
males to meet that need. The outcome was high levels of revenue and of state capacity 
generally. Tax effort, calculated as explained in Section 1, was unusually high in the labour 
reserve economies, as was the proportion of revenue raised through direct income taxes 
levied on individuals and businesses. That pattern is still evident today.14 This part of Africa 
in particular has become a semi-permanent, partial exception to the rule that governments of 
low-income countries find it difficult to raise revenue through direct income taxes.  
Direct head and hut taxes served non-revenue purposes. They helped to increase the flow of 
manual labour to European-owned enterprises, and provided means—formal or informal—of 
remunerating the local agents of colonial rule who were responsible for collecting them. 
However, for the reasons explained above, they were never a first choice from the 
perspective of those responsible for funding colonial regimes. The rapid expansion of 
international trade in the early 20th century provided opportunities to collect taxes more 
easily and cheaply, by taxing revenues from trade. Where international trade flourished, 
colonial authorities reduced their dependence on direct taxes, and sometimes abolished 
them entirely. Direct taxes remained more significant, and politically salient, in landlocked 
areas less affected by foreign trade, where per capita incomes were generally lower 
(Frankema and van Waijenburg 2014). 
Head and hut taxes were, in the language I set out above, challenging but enforceable. The 
two other main sources of colonial state revenues, especially trade taxes and to some extent 
non-tax revenues, rather meet my definition of easy taxes. While conceptually distinct, both 
stemmed largely from the rapid growth in exports of products like palm oil, cocoa, sisal, 
cotton, groundnuts, coffee, rubber, and tobacco, and the food and manufactured imports that 
they financed. Africa was integrated into world trade in the 19th and 20th centuries 
principally as an exporter of primary commodities and an importer of manufactures. It was 
one of the most trade-oriented regions of the world. We do not have comprehensive and 
reliable figures for the period before 1960, but we know that Africa’s share of world trade 
increased substantially in the 1920s and 1930s (Federico and Tena-Junguito 2019: 27). By 
the 1960s, the trade ratio (the ratio of imports and exports to GDP) for SSA was much higher 
than for any other poor world region (Table 1). Levying customs duties on imports and 
exports is historically the default method for large-scale political units to collect revenue.15 
 
13  His operational definition of the concept covers Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
14  Mkandawire demonstrated that this historical pattern showed up in comparisons between revenue-raising efforts in Africa 
over the period 1980–2004. Ligomeka (2019: chapter 6) shows that it persisted  up to 2015.  
15  It is generally easier to collect revenue at jurisdictional borders than, for example, to pursue and hassle small domestic 




Between 1900 and 1990, trade taxes accounted for between 30 and 40 per cent of total 
government revenue in the region (Albers et al. 2020: 5).  
Table 1 Average national trade ratio (ratio of imports and exports to GDP) for 3 
regions, by decade, 1960–2019 
 1960–69 1970–79 1980–89 1990–99 2000–09 2010–19 
SSA 43 48 43 46 60 56 
South Asia 13 14 18 25 38 45 
Latin America & Caribbean 20 24 26 31 39 42 
Source: World Development Indicators. 
In the colonial period, trade taxes were levied mainly on imports. International trade 
generated additional government revenue through another channel. SSA, particularly West 
Africa, has been notorious for public infrastructure spending driven primarily by the needs of 
the colonial commodity export economy. Economic activity was concentrated on a small 
number of large ports, most of them also territorial capitals, that were the terminal points of 
railway lines used to move agricultural commodity exports from the rural hinterland, without 
connecting to transport networks in neighbouring countries (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 
2020: 76–77).16 Colonial governments often owned the ports and railways, and, through the 
user charges they levied, benefited from significant ‘non-tax revenues’ (Albers et al. 2020; 
Frankema and Booth 2020).  
In the 19th and 20th centuries, state fiscal authorities in Britain, aware of their ultimate 
answerability to a parliament dominated by large tax-paying interests, made great efforts to 
obtain taxpayer consent to new fiscal measures (Daunton 2001). British colonial 
administrators in Africa, like those of other colonial powers, operated under few such 
constrains in their taxing and spending. They rarely suffered much large-scale organized 
resistance from taxpayers. Indeed, there have been few cases of violent popular tax 
resistance in the region from that time until today.17 To some extent at least, ordinary 
Africans seem to have become socialized into perceiving themselves as duty-bearing 
taxpayers. Contemporary surveys suggest that today most perceive taxpaying to be a civic 
responsibility (Aiko and Logan 2014). 
  
 
companies are in some ways attractive targets for the tax collector, but they often enjoy political influence and 
considerable bargaining power. They are generally not as vulnerable as transborder traders, who continually face the 
threat that, if they reject customs officers’ assessments, their goods will be held at the border for days or weeks, if not 
impounded. 
16  In recent decades the shift from railways to road transport, along with some road building, has provided long-distance 
traders with more choice over the ports in which to operate their import or export businesses—and thus scope to choose 
between the offers made for their businesses by competing customs posts. Competition can be within country or, 
especially in West Africa, among countries.  





4  The historical trajectory: independence and 
after18 
 
Colonial administrations generally had limited ambitions. Their principal functions were to 
keep order and allow the commodity export economy to thrive. Accordingly, they were not 
strongly motivated to raise large revenues. It was only very late in the colonial period that 
notions of investing public money to promote ‘development’ became at all widespread. 
Independent African governments had greater aspirations, and correspondingly experienced 
greater revenue needs (Herbst 2000; Young 1994). Their initial targets were the economic 
surpluses generated by agricultural commodity exports. Colonial regimes had mostly left 
these untouched, principally because taxing them would impair the profits of commodity-
trading firms based in the colonial metropoles.19 In the 1960s and early 1970s, many African 
governments used both export taxes and administratively controlled foreign currency 
exchange rates to extract high—and sometimes ruinous—proportions of the incomes earned 
from agricultural commodity exports (Bates 1977; Bates 2008; Lipton 1977). These initiatives 
petered out after two decades or less. This was not generally because of major political 
resistance from cultivators, but rather because the revenue base wilted. High effective taxes, 
combined with a general decline in world market prices for Africa’s commodity exports from 
the mid-1970s, made much agricultural commodity production unprofitable. Many farmers 
shifted to other crops, or to smuggling produce across borders to countries where export tax 
rates were less punishing.20  
 
Independent governments also took more conventional measures to try to boost revenues, 
including the introduction of new and more modern taxes to broaden the collection base. 
Most introduced a broad sales tax in the 1960s or 1970s, generally in response to external 
advice and along the lines of the sales taxes that were well established in high-income 
countries.21 Through processes about which we have no consistent record, personal income 
tax (PIT) changed in character. In the colonial era, this term sometimes applied to the 
regressive direct head and hut taxes discussed above, levied mainly on people with low 
incomes.22 These were deeply unpopular, and gradually withered—or were taken over by 
local governments. Today, every country in SSA has a conventional PIT that is designed 
only to tax higher incomes. Typically, however, it does not achieve that aim. Very commonly, 
almost all PIT revenues come through the automatic deductions made from employees’ 
salaries by government organizations and a few large private firms under the label of Pay-
As-You-Earn (PAYE).23 The fact that other PIT revenues are small indicates, as other 
 
18  The main text does not deal with the impact of aid on revenue collection. For a period, SSA was quite aid-dependent. 
There is a plausible deductive argument that aid necessarily reduces the incentives for government to collect taxes from 
their own citizens and companies (Moyo 2009). The evidence suggests otherwise (Clist 2016; Morrissey et al. 2014). 
19  Exceptions were the Gold Coast (Ghana), where taxes on cocoa exports were introduced before independence, and 
Uganda, where cotton exports were taxed soon after the establishment of colonial rule. 
20  In the course of these tussles, the non-tax revenues that governments had earned from operating railways and ports 
shrank considerably (Albers et al. 2020: 5). Today, in most of SSA—as in most parts of the world except some large-
scale energy and mineral exporters—non-tax revenues account for only a few percentage points of total tax revenue. 
21  I define a broad-based sales tax as one that qualifies for the label GST (General Sales Tax) in the Tax Introduction 
Database (TID, https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/65326). The TID identifies four countries in SSA in which GST was 
introduced during colonial rule, and another 34 in which it was introduced later. Among those 34 countries, 23 introduced 
GST in the 1960s or 1970s. 
22  In the 48 countries for which there are data in the TID (see previous footnote), 33 had introduced PIT during colonial rule. 
23  This information is available mostly where revenue collection statistics incorporate one figure for total income tax 
collection from individuals and another for total collections from PIT deductions made from pay cheques by employers 
(PAYE). The PAYE classification does not appear in the revenue statistics for francophone countries, but there are OECD 
data for five anglophone sub-Saharan African countries. In 2015, PAYE accounted for 97 per cent of total PIT collections 




sources also tell us, that wealthy business people, highly paid professionals, and property 
owners are paying very little through the PIT mechanism (Section 7). 
Trade taxes continued to be the largest single revenue source until the 1990s. The 
immediate reason for their relative decline thereafter was a set of national policy decisions to 
heavily cut rates of tax on imports and exports. But those decisions were shaped by 
changing material conditions. While the ratio of international trade to GDP continued to 
increase in SSA after 1960, the increase was small and unsteady (Table 1).24 Africa was not 
participating in the growth of global trade to anything like the degree of other low-income 
regions, and was to some extent being pushed to the margins of the global economy (Collier 
2007). This lack of dynamism in the trade sector was one of the motivations for a package of 
tax reforms that included these reductions in trade taxes (mainly in import duties) and the 
introduction of the new VAT to replace the revenues lost. The tax reform package and the 
consequences of VAT are discussed in more detail in Section 5. For present purposes, it is 
useful to bear in mind that, with the introduction of VAT, revenues collected on imports 
declined far less than it would appear from the formal revenue accounts. Those accounts 
register big apparent shifts in revenue sources from ‘trade taxes’ to ‘VAT’. But those are to 
some extent illusory. Probably around half of VAT revenues in the region are collected on 
imports, by the same customs officials who collect import duties, effectively through the 
same sets of assessment and collection procedures.25  
This technical point about revenue classification relates to a larger issue. Trends and 
changes in tax collection levels in SSA today are still largely determined by international 
trade variables beyond the control of governments: the prices paid for imports and, even 
more, the fluctuating prices received for exports. It is important to understand the underlying 
sources of tax revenue, as opposed to formal classifications, and to bear those sources in 
mind when making either judgements about overall revenue collection performance or 
projections about future trends. We can illustrate the importance of global prices for export 
commodities using the Lund measure of total tax collections (Section 2). They suggest three 
main post-colonial ‘revenue eras’:  
• Total revenues increased fairly fast from around 1960—approximately the peak of 
the decolonization process—until the mid-1970s. That was in part because world 
market prices for Africa’s agricultural commodity exports were relatively buoyant at 
this time. 
• There was then a period of around two decades, from the mid-1970s to the mid-
1990s—after the efforts to extract revenue from commodity exports had largely 
fizzled out—when average national revenues almost plateaued. In this period, global 
prices for Africa’s commodity exports were depressed, African governments became 
caught in major debt crises, its economies were performing poorly, and the outside 
 
the same definition, in Swaziland and Uganda, respectively. In Ghana, ‘employees’ income tax’ amounted to 93 per cent 
of PIT collections (OECD 2015: 178, 187, 193, 199, and 176).    
24  Trade ratios have in recent decades increased much faster in most of the rest of the world. Today, the average trade 
ratio in SSA is not much above the ratios for South Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean (Table 1).  
25  Many national tax authorities do not separate out import and domestic VAT in their revenue reports. The OECD provides 
figures for 2015 on eight mainland sub-Saharan African countries: Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Kenya, Niger, Togo, and Uganda. In these cases, import VAT ranged from 37 to 70 per cent of total VAT 
collections, and averaged 54 per cent (OECD 2015: 169–99). For 2019–20, the World Customs Organization provides 
data for 24 countries in mainland SSA on the proportion of revenue collected by customs that derives from ‘general 
consumption taxes’. This is likely to refer almost exclusively to VAT. On average, these account for 49 per cent of total 




world began to believe that Africa was uniquely cursed by intractable governance 
problems.26 
• For the next two decades, from the mid-1990s until about 2012, average revenues 
again increased rapidly. This reflected both significant positive rates of economic 
growth in some parts of Africa and, again, high prices for commodity exports—but 
this time mainly prices of oil, gas, and minerals, rather than agricultural exports, 
which had greatly shrunk in value (Section 6). 
Two issues mentioned above—the tax reform package and introduction of VAT, and the 
taxation of the new extractives export economy—are discussed in more detail in Sections 6 
and 7. They broadly represent the more positive and the more problematic aspects, 
respectively, of the ways in which national tax systems in SSA in recent decades have been 
adapted to the changing global context. Tax reform, especially the introduction of VAT, has 
opened up new revenue sources and to some extent improved the ways in which national 
tax administrations interact with taxpayers. By contrast, the new extractives sector, which 
represents a significant fraction of the regional economy, has to a large degree evaded the 
tax net. The contradictory effects of these two forces help to explain why the average 
revenue collection performance in the region in recent decades has been mediocre. The 
normal expectation is that sustained economic growth will lead to some increase in the ratio 
of tax collection to GDP. The sub-Saharan African regional economy has grown, but, over 
the period 1980–2017, the average ratio of national tax collection to GDP has not changed 
perceptibly (Gupta and Liu 2020).  
 
 
5  Revenue reform  
 
In most countries, tax reform seems to be a continuous process. At each annual budget, if 
not more often, ministers of finance announce changes in tax rates, in tax administrative 
processes, and often in tax law and in the structure of tax administration. While tax systems 
in SSA slowly evolved in this way for much of the 20th century, there was a significant 
change in pace in the 1990s. This resulted in part from widespread public sector debt crises 
in Africa in the 1980s, concern within African governments about the sustainability of their 
revenue bases, and the greater policy leverage available to the IMF, the World Bank, and 
aid donors after they stepped in to help deal with the debt crises. It also coincided with a 
leap in levels of democracy and political competition in Africa following the collapse of the 
Soviet Bloc and the end of the Cold War around 1990. Especially in the anglophone 
countries, tax reform became a more widespread and conscious process, with some 
measure of agreement on the goals. Not only were many African governments beset by 
problems of economic stagnation and debt, but their efforts since independence to seek new 
revenue sources had not been very successful. They were ready to accept advice that 
promised to remedy that. The IMF and a range of other international organizations and aid 
donors were willing to give it. The IMF in particular had an institutional responsibility to help 
indebted governments to raise more revenue so that they could reliably repay their 
(concessionary) loans and ultimately become creditworthy in the eyes of commercial 
lenders. There was perceptible African buy-in—most visibly from Uganda and Rwanda, 
where new reforming governments took over in 1986 and 1994, respectively, following 
periods of civil war and the near-collapse of state institutions. Albeit raggedly, and mostly 
without much public enthusiasm, African governments went along with the advice that there 
was a set of best practices in tax policy and administration, exemplified by those found in 
 
26  It is likely that governance did deteriorate in the 1970s and 1980s, and that the decline in revenue collections in some 




rich countries, towards which they should move. That ‘best practices’ package, which had 
begun to emerge in the 1970s—mainly from within and around the IMF—encompassed two 
foundational principles: 
• Revenue systems should be used to raise revenue efficiently. They should not 
typically be used for purposes of social engineering (e.g. redistributing income) or as 
tools for interventionist economic policies (e.g. promoting investment in particular 
industries), on the grounds that they are not effective for these purposes, and that 
the pursuit of competing goals tends to undermine the mission of efficient revenue 
collection. 
• Tax administration is not secondary to tax policy; it largely is tax policy. Second-rate 
tax administration can easily undermine apparently first-rate tax policies. Improved 
tax administration should be a priority, with simplification as a key component: simple 
rules and principles; minimal tax exemptions; a narrow range of taxes; and few rate 
bands for any one tax.27 
To these general principles, the IMF added a more substantive item. African governments 
should greatly reduce the tax rates they charged on imports and exports, in the interest of 
promoting international trade and economic specialization. In return, they were invited—
sometimes quite insistently—to introduce the relatively new VAT, which had been initiated in 
France in 1964 and was steadily becoming global. It was mainly at the insistance of the 
World Bank and the British aid programme that another substantive item was added into the 
reform package: the removal of the tax administration function from the direct control of 
ministers of finance into new and putatively integrated semi-autonomous revenue authorities 
(henceforth SARAs).  
The reform process has been extensively described and analysed elsewhere (Fossat and 
Bua 2013; Kloeden 2011; Moore 2014). For present purposes, the important points are: 
• The most tangible and consequential change, the introduction of VAT, came early in 
the process.28 
• There has been considerable progress in, among other things: changing 
organizational structures to reduce the amount of face-to-face contact between tax 
staff and taxpayers, and to shift the processes of assessment and collection toward 
more formal and impersonal channels; recruiting tax staff with higher educational and 
professional qualifications; increasing the proportion of female tax staff; and using 
digital and online technologies, especially for filing tax returns and making payments. 
On a range of measures of the quality of national tax administration, SSA now scores 
well relative to other lower-income world regions (Moore et al. 2018: 32–34).  
• SARAs have been established in virtually every anglophone country and a few 
others.29 Although the evidence on their direct effect on revenue levels is 
ambiguous,30 this reform, along with the establishment of the African Tax 
 
27  This approach to taxation has been labelled neo-liberal. That is valid to the extent that it represented a reaction against 
the previous tendency, globally and in Africa, to use taxation as an instrument for broad government activism and 
intervention. However, to the extent that the intention is to strengthen the state through better and more revenue 
collection, without significant privatization, the neo-liberal label is misplaced (Fjeldstad and Moore 2009). 
28  Today, VAT is in place in 40 countries in SSA. In 30 of those cases, it was introduced between 1990 and 2004, which 
was approximately the time of the initial wave of tax reforms. The figures are from the TID 
(https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/65326). By contrast, slightly fewer than half the SARAs currently in place were 
operational by 2004 (Dom 2019: table A.2). 
29  Angola, Burundi, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Togo. 
30  Roel Dom’s (2019) very careful research on SSA indicates that the creation of SARAs has not generally resulted in 
greater increases in revenue collection compared with countries where they were not created. But SARA is a legal 
concept; the formal existence of a SARA does not necessarily indicate the degree of policy and managerial autonomy 
actually enjoyed by its senior executives. There is some recent evidence that, on a global basis, greater autonomy for 




Administration Forum in 2009, fostered the emergence of something approaching a 
pan-African professional cadre of tax administration specialists with growing policy 
influence. 
• VAT has emerged as the star of the show, albeit in controversial and rather puzzling 
ways. Publicly, it receives much more abuse than applause, and has always been 
criticized on the largely unjustified grounds that it is believed to have regressive 
effects on income distribution.31 Initially, too, the IMF was widely criticized for 
pressuring African tax administrations to adopt a tax that is administratively so 
complex. In essence, the burden of paying VAT falls on the final consumer of goods 
and services. But it is payable at each point in the production process where there is 
an economic transaction: when the logger sells her wood to the sawmill, and again 
when the sawmill sell planks to the furniture maker, the furniture maker sells tables to 
the furniture shop, and the furniture shop sells those tables to consumers. 
Businesses registered for VAT need to keep accounts of all payments and receipts 
such that they actually pay the tax on the difference between their input costs and 
their receipts—their value-added. In principle, VAT embodies a partial self-enforcing 
mechanism. Each transaction creates a paper or electronic record, and at each point 
buyers and sellers have opposed incentives to under-value or over-value the 
transaction. That mechanism will, however, function only if tax administrations check 
records and sanction consistent defaulters, and thus give the message that the rules 
need to be obeyed. Such checking rarely takes place in SSA (Mascagni et al. 2021). 
Tax experts can provide an extensive list of faults in the design and administration of 
VAT in Africa. They include: an excessive and probably growing number of industry 
or product-specific exemptions that undermine VAT as an information source for tax 
administrators; and procedural problems and corruption in the payment of VAT 
refunds to exporters. There is a standard measure of the efficiency of VAT 
administration: actual collections as a proportion of potential collections. That figure 
is lower for SSA than for any other world region (Keen 2013). Despite all these 
problems, VAT remains—in SSA and elsewhere in the world—an excellent way for 
governments to raise revenue. Its primary strength lies in the fact that it mainly 
replaces sales taxes, which are principally levied on retailers, who can often and 
easily evade them. Being collectable at each point in the production chain, VAT is a 
more effective way of vacuuming in the cash. Tax administrations have become 
adept at deploying it. In SSA, VAT rates tend to be high, and VAT not only is the 
major single source of revenue by tax type, but also accounts for a higher proportion 
of government revenue here than in any other world region (Gendron and Bird 2020: 
5).32  
There is a widespread expert perception, backed by research evidence (Chang et al. 2020) 
that the kinds of tax reform that have been adopted in SSA, although in many respects 
products of global ideas and globally influential organizations, tend to work in poor countries. 
There is little evidence that the overall direction of reform has been mistaken. The 
challenges to raising more revenue in SSA lie in a series of more specific problems (Moore 
and Prichard 2017). In terms of magnitudes, both historically and for the foreseeable future, 
the biggest problem lies in governments’ failure to capture a reasonable share of the surplus 
earned from the extraction of oil, gas, and minerals. 
 
31  In essence, many of the goods consumed by poorer people are exempt from VAT, either by policy design (especially 
with regard to food) or because the enterprises that produce and retail the goods and services they consume are so small 
that they are not required to register for VAT (Alavuotunki and Pirttila 2015; Fischer et al. 2006). 
32  As noted in Section 3, this is partly because of the high ratio of international trade to GDP and partly due to the fact that 
around half of VAT is collected on imports. It also reflects the fact that governments generally do not make enthusiastic 




6  Extractives problems 
 
The principal exports of most colonial territories in SSA were agricultural commodities. Large-scale 
mining has a long history in the region but was concentrated in South Africa, Northern 
Rhodesia/Zambia, and the Congo (Congo/DRC). The balance between the two export sectors began 
to shift around 1970. Agricultural commodities went into relative decline (Section 4), and energy and 
mineral commodities blossomed. Nigeria and Gabon began to export oil in 1970. They were joined in 
1973 by the Republic of Congo (Congo) and in 1979 by Cameroon. In the next few decades, the 
global centre of gravity of extractives activities shifted somewhat from the Middle East and North 
Africa to SSA and Central Asia (Tables 2 and 3). Oil, gas, and minerals have become the dominant 
source of export earnings for SSA. For the five-year period 2014–18, fuel, minerals, and metals 
accounted for an average of 52 per cent of total exports by value, compared with only 15 per cent for 
animal, vegetable, and food products.33 











Total energy and 
mineral rents 
[(b) to (e)] 
Total natural 
resources rents  
[(a) to (e)] 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
1971–79 2.5 0.9 1.6 0 4.5 7.0 9.5 
1980–89 2.5 1.2 1.8 Negligible 3.3 6.3 8.8 
1990–99 3.9 0.8 0.7 Negligible 3.5 5.0 8.9 
2000–09 3.0 0.9 1.0 0.2 7.3 9.4 12.4 
2010–18 2.7 0.6 2.2 0.5 6.0 9.3 12.0 
Source: World Development Indicators. 
Table 3 Total natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP, by world region 1971–
2018 
 1971–79 1980–89 1990–99 2000–09 2010–18 
Middle East & North Africa 35 22 17 26 23 
SSA 9 9 9 12 12 
Russia, Caucasus & Central Asia n.a. n.a. 8 22 15 
Latin America & Caribbean 4 6 3 5 5 
North America 3 3 1 1 1 
South Asia 2 3 2 3 3 
East Asia & Pacific 2 3 1 2 2 
European Union Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible 
World 3 3 1 3 3 
Note: Figures cover rents from forestry, coal, oil, natural gas, and minerals, but exclude diamonds. They are 
weighted averages for each region.   
Source: World Development Indicators.  
This shift towards extractives is likely to continue.34 The revenue futures of an increasing 
number of sub-Saharan African countries therefore depend to a significant degree on the 
capacities of their governments to obtain a reasonable share of the rents—i.e. the surpluses 
over and above costs of production and normal profit—that typically result from the depletion 
 
33  Data are from World Trade Indicators (https://wits.worldbank.org/wits/wits/witshelp/Content/Utilities/ 
e1.trade_indicators.htm).  
34  The geology of Africa has been only lightly explored relative to much of the rest of the globe. However, exploration for 
new sub-soil resources tends to be especially successful there (Moore et al. 2018: 111), so the relative importance of the 
extractive sector may continue to increase, and more countries may join Mozambique and Uganda as new extractives 
exporters. Policies to reduce the extent of global warming are likely to result in increases in the prices of minerals and 




of natural capital, i.e. when oil, gas, minerals, and coal are dug up, and forests are cut down. 
Highly competent governments that serve the public interest should be able to use taxes and 
royalties to acquire nearly all those rents for the public treasury, leaving the operating 
companies, whether public or private, with enough of the surplus to cover costs and motivate 
investment. In reality, governments rarely manage to capture anything close to 100 per cent 
of the rents. In large part because the prospect of grabbing a share of them attracts an 
enormous amount of political activity (along with corruption and the use or threat of armed 
force), the public treasury always has to make do with less that the full amount of rent. 
However, among the governments that formally licence and oversee significant natural 
resource extraction activities, those in SSA (and in Central Asia) are much less successful 
than those of other regions, notably the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), in capturing a 
good share of natural resource rents (Tables 4 and 5).35  
Table 4 Extent of government capture of natural resource rents, 2017–21 
Region and number of 
country observations 
(a) Average total natural 
resource rents as % of GDP 
(b) Average total natural resource 
revenues as % of GDP 
(b)/(a) 
SSA (18) 21 10 0.49 
Central Asia (5) 26 11 0.43 
MENA (6) 35 33 0.73 
Other countries (16) 13 10 0.76 
Note: Includes all countries where, for the period covered, total natural resource rents exceeded 5% of GDP. Figures are 
simple averages for countries in each region. 
Source: World Development Indicators (column (a)); IMF (column (b)). 
Table 5 Extent of government capture of natural resource rents, 2014–18 
Region and number of 
country observations 
(a) Average total natural 
resource rents as % of GDP 
(b) Average total natural resource 
revenues as % of GDP 
(b)/(a) 
SSA (19) 18 06 0.53 
Central Asia (3) 22 11 0.50 
MENA (6) 27 24 0.88 
Other countries (9) 15 09 0.62 
Note: Includes all countries where, for the period covered, total natural resource rents exceeded 5% of GDP. Figures are 
simple averages for countries in each region. 
Source: World Development Indicators (column (a)); IMF (column (b)). 
The reasons for this failure are complex and multi-layered. For Central Asia, part of the 
explanation is that the sector is new. It has grown enormously since the collapse of the 
Soviet Bloc, and governments are still learning how deal with that growth. But that 
explanation is less plausible for much of SSA, which has more experience with extractives. 
Ultimately, the explanation lies in inequalities in political and institutional power. For 
example, most oil-exporting governments in MENA have established some kind of national 
oil (and gas) parastatal corporation that directly controls production, and sometimes 
exploration, licensing, refining, transporting, and trading. By contrast, in SSA the extraction 
of oil, gas, and minerals is almost all in the hands of large private transnational corporations. 
But it is not just a matter of well intentioned but weak governments being outwitted by 
powerful transnationals. There is abundant evidence that the possibility of grabbing shares 
of natural resource rents has motivated levels of political competition and corruption that 
directly contribute to weakening states, including their efforts to get tax revenues from 
 
35  The figures in Tables 4 and 5 derive from the only significant datasets I have been able to locate that quantify revenues 
from natural resources for large samples of countries over a recent period of several years. The IMF figures are likely the 
more accurate. Actual values for any one country will fluctuate from year to year in response to, among other things, 




natural resources.36 Not all natural resource rents that fail to end up in the public treasury go 
to transnational companies. Significant amounts are distributed through political channels of 
various kinds and end up in private pockets and in bank accounts and other assets abroad 
(Moore et al. 2018: chapter 5).   
 
 
7  Glimpses of fiscal states  
 
Political economists of various persuasions convincingly argue that long-term national 
political and economic development is significantly driven by synergies between higher 
revenue collection, improved public services, a more consensual and efficient style of tax 
administration, and a deeper engagement of citizens in peaceable political competition 
around fiscal policy (Besley and Persson 2013; Steinmo 2018). There is some statistical 
evidence that these synergies are at work in contemporary SSA.37 But they are not visible to 
the naked eye, and likely not very strong. Taxing practices seem focused on meeting 
revenue collection targets, as opposed to either improving the experience for taxpayers or 
trying to build up trust in government and in tax administrations. The substantial 
accomplishments in raising large amounts of money are not generally matched by a similar 
level of performance in broader revenue-related governance tasks: distributing the revenue 
tolerably fairly; protecting citizens against extortion in tax collection; achieving transparency; 
and encouraging and facilitating voluntary compliance on the part of taxpayers. 
 
In the light of that general understanding of interactions between tax and governance, there 
seems to be some tension between the fact that sub-Saharan African states are relatively 
proficient tax collectors and the widespread perception that the region has not been very 
successful in constructing stable and legitimate political order. How can governments that 
are not generally high performers in terms of legitimacy and overall effectiveness score well 
in terms of revenue collection? There is in fact no great puzzle or contradiction. The 
conventional wisdom is couched at a high level of generalization. A few basic organizational 
features of tax collection explain how governments equipped only with the rudiments of a tax 
administration apparatus and some capacity to exercise coercion are able to earn sufficient 
revenue to keep themselves in business—albeit at the cost of abrasive relationships with 
taxpayers.  
The organizational mission for ‘basic taxation’ could not be more clear: to reach or exceed 
annual collection targets. Those targets can be allocated precisely among sub-units and 
individual staff members, and between months or quarters. Performance can be 
continuously and closely monitored. Staff should not generally lack job motivation, since a 
significant fraction of their formal remuneration is tied to achieving collection targets, and the 
opportunity to supplement earnings informally helps to ensure that the job is materially 
attractive and worth retaining. Should staff under-perform, replacement is not difficult. High 
levels of professional training or competence are not required. This brutally simple 
organizational model enabled early African colonial administrations to extract significant 
revenues from distinctly ‘dry’ (or ‘non-juicy’) sources. Proficient tax administrations were 
constructed principally on the bases of this muscular approach to collection and access to 
relatively large, easy-to-tax international trade sectors (Section 3). Recent reforms have 
relaxed some of the muscularity and extended the capacity to tax internal economic 
transactions (Section 5).  
 
36  There is a very large literature on this, under the rubric of the ‘resource curse’.  




For the last two decades or more, most African states have qualified as tax states in the 
original Schumpeterian sense of the term (Introduction): they finance themselves mainly 
from broad general taxation, and not principally from the earnings of state-owned assets like 
land, industry, mines, post offices, and railways, or from state trading monopolies in products 
like salt or alcohol.38 Before the impact of Covid, a few were becoming fiscal states. They 
had established sufficiently reliable tax bases—and thus debt repayment capacities—to be 
able to borrow at commercial rates on international financial markets (Introduction). 
However, even before the (still uncertain) impact of Covid on African economies, revenues, 
and public policies, the prospects of increasing government revenue collections faster than 
rates of increase in GDP were uncertain (Introduction). Genuine statistical ignorance and 
uncertainty are at play. GDP figures are not very reliable. The revenues obtained from the 
extractives sector—often large even if well below the theoretical potential—are poorly 
accounted for, and they vary considerably in response to fluctuations in international 
commodity prices. We are still unable, for the region as a whole, accurately to track revenue 
trends separately for the extractive and the non-extractive sectors. We do not know how well 
tax administrations are doing in capturing additional income generated outside the extractive 
sector. But it is reasonable to assume rocky paths towards both (a) increasing revenue 
collections relative to GDP and (b) constructing more taxpayer-friendly collection systems. I 
conclude by summarizing five significant problem areas. 
First, African tax administrations are unable adequately to tax transnational corporations and 
transactions. This is especially true in relation to renewable natural resource extraction 
(Section 5), but the basic dynamics are similar in tobacco and alcohol, where small numbers 
of large TNCs lobby effectively against sensible levels of excise taxes (Savedoff and Alwang 
2015), and newer expanding economic sectors like telecommunications and transactions in 
digital services (and by digital means). In these latter sectors, dearth of technical knowledge 
and capacity within tax administrations is clearly an important part of the story. That seems 
less significant in relation to natural resource extraction or tobacco and alcohol. There is an 
abundance of good technical advice on how best to tax natural resource extraction. A more 
immediate cause of poor performance is political competition of all kinds, mostly involving 
illegality and corruption, to grab shares of the very large natural resource rents. It is, 
however, always difficult to allocate responsibility for taxation failures between ‘politics’ on 
the one side and ‘administrative incapacity’ on the other. The organizational incapacity of 
any tax administration may be the result of policy decisions to protect particular interests 
against taxation, in deniable ways, by tying the hands of the tax collector. Tax 
administrations may be rendered incompetent through, among other things, limitations on 
their budgets or investigatory powers, omissions or bad drafting in legislation, or the choice 
of senior staff.    
Second, African tax administrations tend not to use their muscle very actively against richer 
Africans. This is not a new problem. The UN pointed it out in the 1970s, when there were far 
fewer wealthy Africans than today (Herbst 2000: 119). There is some evidence that the 
cause lies more in politics than in capacity constraints within tax administrations. The 
immediate reason that many modestly wealthy Africans pay little or no personal income tax 
is not that they hide their incomes and assets in offshore bank accounts and trusts that are 
hard to track down; it is rather that tax administrations make little effort even to ensure that 
they complete an annual personal tax return (Kangave et al. 2016; Kangave et al. 2018; 
Kangave et al. 2020). In a similar way, governments make limited efforts to update property 
 
38  As explained in Section 6, African states have found it particularly difficult to collect revenue from the most visible and 




registers and property tax systems in cities where real estate investments and prices are 
booming.39  
Third, tax systems tightly focused on meeting aggregate collection targets tend to generate 
more problems and collateral damage as they pan out from their core territory of taxing the 
movement of goods through ports and the sales and profits of larger businesses. The costs 
are borne mainly by small and very small businesses. They are relatively powerless in their 
dealings with field-level tax staff, whose senior national tax administrators exercise little 
supervisory oversight, in part because those administrators are focused on the small number 
of larger companies that, in most African countries, provide a high proportion of the revenues 
collected. Further, harassment of smaller businesses is to some extent embedded in 
organizational policies and procedures. Recent research reveals the extent to which even 
the more competent African tax administrations require small-scale enterprises to follow 
complex and obscure procedures in filing their tax returns (Mascagni et al. 2020), and to 
register as taxpayers even when the chances that they should or will actually pay tax are 
very small (Moore 2020).  
Fourth, the ways in which small businesses are treated in part reflects the fact that African 
national tax administrations tend to be responsible for taxing both (a) large-scale business 
and (b) the very small enterprises that in other circumstances would be clients of the 
revenue collectors working for sub-national governments (Moore 2020). Most states in SSA 
are fiscally highly centralized, to the extent that there is little reliable public information on 
either the revenues or the expenditures of local government. National and sub-national fiscal 
systems sometimes barely mesh at all; national authorities may simply not know what 
revenues sub-national governments are collecting, or how they are using them. The main 
cause of this dualism lies deep in history. When in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
European colonial authorities fully extended their rule over the African territories they had 
allocated to themselves at inter-governmental meetings in Berlin, they had very low budgets, 
and were often interested in doing little more than basic revenue collection, for which they 
used locally influential intermediaries (Section 3). Those intermediaries, typically labelled 
‘traditional chiefs’, often remain influential today (Logan 2009; Mamdani 1996). In much of 
Africa, local government is not very formalized or institutionalized.40 It is for this reason in 
practice difficult to distinguish between the realm of formal local government taxation and the 
realm of non-state revenue raising, populated by community groups, traditional chiefs, 
religious organizations, vigilantes, and armed militias. It is likely that more people in SSA pay 
taxes at the local level to these kinds of agents than to official national tax collectors. The 
degree of coercion exercised in local-level collection varies widely. All the evidence suggests 
that the amounts collected are significant as a proportion of the incomes of the taxpayers, 
and that the burden is almost always distributed regressively (Van den Boogaard and 
Prichard 2016). 
Finally, the standard approach to tax reform that in recent decades has been relatively 
successful in the region—and especially in the anglophone countries—is not appropriate to 
the swathe of states across the centre of Africa currently affected by political instability, 
armed conflict, and cross-border insurgencies. The standard approach emphasizes the 
cultivation of quasi-voluntary compliance over muscular enforcement, the integration of 
different taxing functions and organizations, and the shifting of the tax burden from 
international trade to internal economic transactions. It assumes relatively centralized polities 
 
39  Also, because power in SSA tends still to inhere in the state apparatus itself and the people who staff it, government 
organizations widely default on their obligations to pay tax or provide tax-related information to the tax administration 
(Saka et al. 2018). 
40  The tax reform processes discussed in Section 5 focused almost entirely—and probably unavoidably—on national-level 




that directly exercise some control over most of their territories and populations. Those 
conditions are not met in significant parts of the Sahel (Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina 
Faso, Niger, Northern Nigeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Sudan, South 
Sudan) or in Somalia. Revenue raising in those states continues to depend relatively heavily 
on customs posts at land frontiers.41 Customs posts are often the only significant nodes of 
state authority over large areas, and sometimes provide funding directly to other state 
agencies in their localities. Most of the countries in question are francophone. None of them 
adopted the (anglophone) fashion of merging customs with internal revenue departments 
within semi-autonomous revenue authorities.42 The increasing emphasis of customs 
responsibilities on border security means that integration is now totally off the policy agenda. 
Francophone customs organizations are by tradition semi-militarized: their staff may receive 
military training, wear full uniform while on duty, and are often armed. Similarly, Sudan’s 
Customs Authority has always been responsible to the Ministry of the Interior rather than the 
Ministry of Finance. The Nigeria Customs Service has an armed Customs Police Unit, and 
staff have recently received firearms training from the army. Thomas Cantens and Gael 
Rabelland (2021) argue persuasively that expanding the capacities and remit of customs 
administrations may be an essential step in the establishment of legitimate political authority 
and peace in Africa’s conflict-affected regions. Other revenue sources cannot easily be 
tapped during conflict.43 Cantens and Rabelland further suggest that reform based around 
the monitoring and data-analysis capacities of digital technologies could contribute 
significantly to reducing the misuse of customs revenues and establishing a greater degree 
of state control. Their analysis constitutes a substantial challenge to the standard reform 
model, and suggests that we need to think more explicitly about the existence of more than 
one high road towards the construction of fiscal states in SSA.  
  
 
41  Customs still collect a large proportion of total government revenues in most countries in SSA, in part because, as 
explained in Section 4, they collect around half of all VAT. The World Customs Organization reports on the proportion of 
total tax revenue collected by customs for 24 countries in mainland SSA for the year 2019–20. On average, customs 
collected 33 per cent of the total. The figures were, however, generally exceptionally low in Southern Africa. If we exclude 
Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa, the average is 40 per cent. Political instability 
typically translates directly into missing revenue statistics. In this case, data are available for only one of the twelve 
conflict-affected countries mentioned in the main text (World Customs Organization 2020: 44–80). 
42  Burundi, Rwanda, and Togo are the only francophone countries to have done this. 







African Development Bank (2021). African Economic Outlook 2021. Abidjan: African 
Development Bank. 
 
Aiko, R., and C. Logan (2014). ‘Africa’s willing taxpayers thwarted by opaque tax systems 
and corruption’. Afrobarometer Policy Paper 7. 
 
Akitoby, B., J. Honda, and K. Primus (2020). ‘Tax revenues in fragile and conflict-affected 
states – why are they low and how can we raise them?’. Working Paper 20/143. 
Washington, DC: IMF. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513550848.001 
 
Alavuotunki, K., and J. Pirttila (2015). ‘The consequences of the value-added tax on 




Albers, T., M. Jerven, and M. Suesse (2020). ‘The fiscal state in Africa: evidence from a 
century of growth’. Working Paper 55/2020. Lund: African Economic History Network. 
 
Bates, R. (1977). Markets and states in tropical Africa. The political basis of agricultural 
policies. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Bates, R.H. (2008). When things fell apart. State failure in late-century Africa. Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511790713 
 
Bayart, J.-F. (1993). The state in Africa. The politics of the belly. London: Longman. 
 
Bayart, J.-F., S. Ellis, and B. Hibou (1999). The criminalization of the state in Africa. Oxford: 
James Currey. 
 
Besley, T., and T. Persson (2013). ‘Taxation and development’. In A. Auerbach, R. Chetty, 




Cantens, T., and G. Rabelland (2021). ‘Taxation and customs reforms in fragile states: 
between bargaining and enforcement’. Working Paper 120. Brighton: International 
Centre for Tax and Development. https://doi.org/10.19088/ICTD.2021.009 
 
Chabal, P., and J.P. Daloz (1999). ‘Africa works: disorder as political instrument’. Oxford and 
Bloomington, IND: James Currey and Indiana University Press. 
 
Chang, E.S., E. Gavin, N. Gueorguiev, and J. Honda (2020). ‘Raising tax revenue: how to 




Clist, P. (2016). ‘Foreign aid and domestic taxation: multiple sources, one conclusion’. 





Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be 
done about it. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Daunton, M. (2001). Trusting Leviathan. The politics of taxation in Britain 1799–1914. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Dom, R. (2019). ‘Semi-autonomous revenue authorities in sub-Saharan Africa: silver bullet 




Englebert, P. (2000). State legitimacy and development in Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner. 
 
Federico, G., and A. Tena-Junguito (2019). ‘World trade, 1800–1938: a new synthesis’. 
Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 37(1): 9–41. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0212610918000216 
 
Fischer, R., P. Gonzalez, and P. Serra (2006). ‘Does competition in privatized social 




Fjeldstad, O.-H., and M. Moore (2009). ‘Revenue authorities and public authority in sub-
Saharan Africa’. Journal of Modern African Studies, 47(1): 1–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X08003637 
 
Fossat, P., and M. Bua (2013). ‘Tax administration reform in the Francophone countries of 
sub-Saharan Africa’. Working Paper 13/173. Washington, DC: IMF. 
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781475581539.001 
 
Frankema, E., and A. Booth (eds) (2020). Fiscal capacity and the colonial state. Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Frankema, E., and M. van Waijenburg (2014). ‘Metropolitan blueprints of colonial taxation? 
Lessons from fiscal capacity building in British and French Africa c. 1880–1940’. 
Journal of African History, 55(3): 371–400. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S002185371400036X 
 
Gendron, P.-P., and R.M. Bird (2020). ‘VAT gaps in developing countries: measurement, 
administration and politics’. Available at SSRN: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3696578 
 
Gupta, S., and J. Liu (2020). ‘Can tax buoyancy in sub-Saharan Africa help finance the 
sustainable development goals?’. Working Paper 532. Washington, DC: Center for 
Global Development. 
 
Herbst, J. (2000). States and power in Africa. Comparative lessons in authority and control. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 






Jerven, M. (2013). Poor numbers: how we are misled by African development statistics and 
what to do about it. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. https://doi.org/10.5771/0506-
7286-2013-3-336 
 
Kangave, J., S. Nakoto, R. Waiswa, and P. Zzimbe (2016). ‘Boosting revenue collection 
through taxing high net worth individuals: the case of Uganda’. Working Paper 45. 
Brighton: International Centre for Tax and Development. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2776590 
 
Kangave, J., S. Nakoto, R. Waiswa, M. Nalukwago, and P. Zzimbe (2018). ‘What can we 
learn from the Uganda Revenue Authority’s approach to taxing high net worth 
individuals?’. Working Paper 72. Brighton: International Centre for Tax and 
Development. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3120579 
 
Kangave, J., K. Byrne, and J. Karangwa (2020). ‘Tax compliance of wealthy individuals in 
Rwanda’. Working Paper 109. Brighton: International Centre for Tax and Development. 
 
Keen, M. (2013). ‘The anatomy of the VAT’. Working Paper 13/111. Washington, DC: IMF. 
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484330586.001 
 
Keen, M., and J. Slemrod (2021). Rebellion, rascals and revenue. Tax follies and wisdom 
through the ages. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691199986 
 
Kloeden, D. (2011). ‘Revenue administration reforms in anglophone Africa since the early 
1990s’. Working Paper 11/162. Washington, DC: IMF. 
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781455296736.001 
 
Lieberman, E.S. (2003). Race and regionalism in the politics of taxation in Brazil and South 
Africa. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615658 
 
Ligomeka, W. (2019). ‘Tax revenue mobilisation in Malawi’. PhD, Development Studies, 
University of Sussex. 
 
Lipton, M. (1977). Why poor people stay poor. urban bias in world development. London: 
Temple Smith. https://doi.org/10.5771/0506-7286-1978-4-462 
 
Logan, C. (2009). ‘Selected chiefs, elected councillors and hybrid democrats: popular 
perspectives on the co-existence of democracy and traditional authority’. Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 47(1): 101–28. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X08003674 
 
Long, C., and M. Miller (2017). ‘Taxation and the sustainable development goals. Do good 
things come to those who tax more?’. Briefing Note. London: Overseas Development 
Institute. 
 
Mamdani, M. (1996). Citizen and subject. Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late 
colonialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Mascagni, G., F. Santoro, D. Mukama, J. Karangwa, and N. Hazimana (2020). ‘Active 






Mascagni, G., R. Dom, and F. Santoro (2021). ‘The VAT in practice: equity, enforcement and 




Michalopoulos, S., and E. Papaioannou (2020). ‘Historical legacies and African 
development’. Journal of Economic Literature, 58(1): 53–128. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20181447 
 
Mkandawire, T. (2010). ‘On tax efforts and colonial heritage in Africa’. Journal of 
Development Studies, 46(10): 1647–69. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2010.500660 
 
Moore, M. (2014). ‘Revenue reform and statebuilding in anglophone Africa’. World 
Development, 60(8): 99–112. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.03.020 
 
Moore, M. (2020). ‘What is wrong with African tax administration?’. Working Paper 111. 
Brighton: International Centre for Tax and Development. 
 
Moore, M., and W. Prichard (2017). ‘How can governments of low-income countries collect 
more tax revenue?’. Working Paper 70. Brighton: International Centre for Tax and 
Development. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3120566 
 
Moore, M., P. Wilson, and O.-H. Fjeldstad (2018). Taxing Africa. Coercion, reform and 
development. London: Zed Press. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350222861 
 
Morrissey, O., W. Prichard, and S. Torrance (2014). ‘Aid and taxation: exploring the 
relationship using new data’. Working Paper 21. Brighton: International Centre for Tax 
and Development. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2496453 
 
Moyo, D. (2009). Dead aid: why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa. 
London: Allen Lane. 
 
OECD (2015). ‘African revenue statistics 1990–2015’. Paris: OECD. 
 
Prichard, W. (2016). ‘Reassessing tax and development research: a new dataset, new 
findings, and lessons for research’. World Development, 80: 48–60. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.11.017 
 
Saka, H., R. Waiswa, and J. Kangave (2018). ‘Taxing government: the case of the Uganda 
Revenue Authority’s Public Sector Office’. Working Paper 84. Brighton: International 
Centre for Tax and Development. 
 
Savedoff, W., and A. Alwang (2015). ‘The single best health policy in the world: tobacco 
taxes’. Policy Paper 62. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. 
 
Schumpeter, J.A. (1918/1991). ‘The crisis of the tax state’. In R.A. Swedberg (ed.), Joseph 
A. Schumpeter. The economics and sociology of capitalism, pp. 99–140. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Steinmo, S. (ed.) (2018). The leap of faith. The fiscal foundations of successful government 







Van den Boogaard, V., and W. Prichard (2016). ‘What have we learned about informal 
taxation in sub-Saharan Africa?’. Summary Brief 2. Brighton: International Centre for 
Tax and Development. 
 
World Customs Organization (2020). Annual Report. Brussels: World Customs Organization. 
https://doi.org/10.30875/4a0b4159-en 
 
Young, C. (1994). The African colonial state in comparative perspective. New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press. 
Yun Casalilla, B., and P.K. O’Brien (eds) (2012). The rise of fiscal states: a global history, 
1500–1914. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139004237 
